Security Incident Report - Unauthorized Access
This report documents an unauthorized access incident that occurred at AcmeTech Solutions.
The purpose of this document is to provide a clear record of what happened, how it was handled, and what improvements are needed.
1. Incident Overview
- Incident ID: ATS-IR-2025-091
- Date & Time Detected: 2025-09-08 02:14 UTC
- Reported By: Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alert
- Detected By: SOC Level 1 Analyst (J. Kim)
- Incident Handler: Security Engineer (M. Patel)
2. Incident Description
- Type of Incident: Unauthorized access attempt
- Description: The IDS flagged repeated failed login attempts on the corporate VPN from an external IP address, followed by a successful login using a valid employee account.
- Affected Systems/Assets:
- VPN Gateway (vpn.acmetechsolutions.com)
- Employee account: j.smith[at]acmetechsolutions.com
- Initial Impact Assessment:
- Possible credential compromise
- No evidence of data exfiltration at the time of detection
3. Timeline of Events
| Date & Time (UTC) | Event Description | Person/Team Responsible |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-09-08 02:14 | IDS alert triggered for brute-force attempts | IDS / SOC |
| 2025-09-08 02:16 | SOC analyst escalated incident to Tier 2 | SOC Analyst |
| 2025-09-08 02:20 | Compromised account disabled | Security Engineer |
| 2025-09-08 02:35 | VPN logs reviewed, no lateral movement detected | SOC Team |
| 2025-09-08 03:00 | Password reset enforced for affected user | IT Support |
| 2025-09-08 03:45 | Investigation concluded, account secured | Security Engineer |
4. Actions Taken
- Containment Measures: Disabled compromised account immediately upon detection.
- Eradication Steps: Blocked the attacker's IP address at the firewall.
- Recovery Actions: Forced company-wide VPN password reset and reviewed MFA logs.
- Communications Made:
- Internal: SOC notified IT and HR teams.
- External: No customer notification required (no confirmed data exposure).
5. Evidence Collected
- Logs: VPN gateway access logs (exported to SIEM).
- Screenshots: IDS alert screenshot attached.
- Network Captures: None (no active malicious traffic during containment).
- Chain of Custody Notes: Logs archived securely with hash verification for integrity.
6. Resolution
- Root Cause Identified: Employee reused corporate password on external service that was breached.
- Permanent Fix Applied: Enforced strict MFA policy for all VPN accounts.
- Systems Restored on: 2025-09-08 03:45 UTC
- Verification Performed By: SOC Lead (A. Johnson)
7. Lessons Learned
- What worked well: IDS effectively detected brute-force activity; SOC responded within 5 minutes.
- What could be improved: Faster escalation path for VPN-related alerts.
- Policy/Procedure Updates Needed: Mandatory security awareness training on password hygiene.
- Additional Security Controls to Implement: Enable anomaly-based detection for unusual login patterns.
8. Reporting & Compliance
- Regulatory Notifications Required: No (no personal data exfiltration confirmed).
- Authorities Notified: None.
- Customers/Partners Notified: None.
- Deadline for Compliance Reporting: Not applicable.
9. Approvals
- Incident Handler: M. Patel ✔️
- Security Manager: A. Johnson ✔️
- Executive Approval: COO - S. Reynolds ✔️
Appendix
- IDS Alert Screenshot
- VPN Access Logs Extract (2025-09-08 02:00-03:30 UTC)
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Note on Content Creation: This article was developed with the assistance of generative AI like Gemini or ChatGPT. While all public AI strives for accuracy and comprehensive coverage, all content is reviewed and edited by human experts at IsoSecu to ensure factual correctness, relevance, and adherence to our editorial standards.
